Agent Swarm security and trust
Agent Swarm is open source and self-hostable. In a self-hosted deployment, your own infrastructure holds the context, memory, logs, files, secrets, and model-provider keys that the system uses. This page separates the controls documented in the Agent Swarm repository from the configuration that remains the operator's responsibility, so that you can evaluate each claim against the source it comes from.
Deployment and data control
The recommended self-hosted deployment runs on Docker Compose, with a Kubernetes and Helm path documented separately. In this mode, the SQLite database that holds tasks, agent memory, and configuration lives on a volume you own, inside your environment. The same is true for logs and files produced by your agents.
Model traffic follows the same boundary. Workers connect directly to the model provider you configure, using your provider keys. Agent Swarm does not impose a model vendor: you choose the provider, the model, and the account under which requests are billed and logged.
Agent Swarm is free software under MIT. For enterprise support, book a conversation. We can discuss support, an SLA, SSO, custom models, and integrations. Agree the services and security requirements for your deployment with the team.
For setup detail, see the deployment guide and the Kubernetes guide.
Runtime isolation
Each worker runs in its own container, and each agent gets a private /workspace/personal workspace. One agent's running processes and personal files are not shared with another agent's. The shared volume is the deliberate exception: /workspace/shared is one volume mounted into every agent and readable across agents, so that agents can exchange research, plans, and context. Treat anything written there as visible to every agent in the swarm, and keep agent-specific files in the personal workspace.
What happens outside those containers belongs to you. Network exposure, HTTPS termination, and firewalling are operator-owned decisions. Whether you terminate TLS with a reverse proxy you already run, and which ports reach the public internet, are your choices to make and to audit.
Version pinning is also your decision, and the default deserves attention. Leaving AGENT_SWARM_VERSION blank tracks the :latest image tag, which is rebuilt and moved on every commit to main — it is not a release. Pin a specific release version in anything you depend on.
Upgrades deserve the same care. Database migrations are forward-only: re-pinning to an older tag does not roll back a schema change, but a database backup taken before the upgrade does. Back up first, upgrade, then verify with the /health endpoint and one completed task rather than /health alone.
Secrets and access
Secrets stored in the Agent Swarm config store — API tokens, OAuth credentials, credential pools, and anything else marked secret — are encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM. The encryption key is resolved in a documented order: the SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable, then SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE pointing to a key file, then an .encryption-key file on the data volume, which the system generates on first boot if neither variable is set.
That design puts one obligation squarely on the operator: back up the key material alongside the database. A lost key means the encrypted secrets are unrecoverable — there is no recovery path, and key rotation is not yet supported. Two values are never accepted into the config store at all: API_KEY and SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY are rejected from the store, so the master credentials cannot be written into the store they protect. The secrets encryption guide documents what key material to back up and which keys are reserved.
Access to the API itself uses one shared operator API_KEY across all services. Every service that can reach the API with that key has operator-level access; treat the key accordingly.
Single sign-on is handled outside the application, by oauth2-proxy in front of the dashboard. Mode 1 is a gate only: users authenticate with your identity provider, and the swarm still sees the one shared API_KEY, with no per-user attribution at the API layer. Mode 2, trusted-header mode, additionally forwards X-Forwarded-User, X-Forwarded-Email, and X-Forwarded-Groups headers to the API, establishing the identity pipeline for per-user attribution as the application layer evolves. In both modes the security property is the same: only the proxy may set those headers, so the API must never be reachable except through the proxy. The SSO guide walks through both configurations.
Role-based access control is on by default: RBAC_ENABLED defaults to true. RBAC gates REST requests authenticated with aswt_ user tokens. Requests authenticated with the operator API key, and calls made by agents themselves, are not gated by it. There are two built-in roles, admin and requester, and every user currently receives admin by default — there is no API or UI to assign roles yet. If role assignment matters to your deployment, track and upvote it on the public feedback board. The full flag list lives in the environment variables reference.
Operational evidence
Agent Swarm can emit OpenTelemetry traces and OTLP metrics from the API server and the worker runners. OpenTelemetry export is off by default and turns on when OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT is set; the data goes to the OTLP-compatible backend you choose, under your account and your retention policy. The observability guide describes the spans and metrics emitted.
Separately, Agent Swarm sends usage telemetry to the maintainers to help them understand how the product is used. That telemetry is on by default, and it never sends task content, prompts, outputs, full email addresses, user names, agent names, or raw user IDs: a person appears only as a hashed reference that stays stable inside your install and cannot be reversed. It is not anonymous at the organization level. Each event carries an organization ID (SWARM_ORG_ID when set to a valid ID, otherwise one generated once and stored as telemetry_org_id), the organization name when you set SWARM_ORG_NAME, and the email domain of your admin, such as example.com, never the full address. Events can therefore be attributed to your organization. To opt out, set ANONYMIZED_TELEMETRY=false on the API server and on every worker; each process checks the flag independently. The telemetry reference lists exactly what each event contains, and its identity-context section defines every field in that envelope.
The table below restates the boundary this whole page is about.
| Documented control | Customer-owned configuration |
|---|---|
| Config-store secrets encrypted at rest with AES-256-GCM | Choosing the key source, backing up the key with the database |
Workers in separate containers, each with a private /workspace/personal workspace |
Host hardening, HTTPS termination, network exposure, firewall rules |
| SSO via oauth2-proxy in gate-only or trusted-header mode | Running the proxy; keeping the API reachable only through it |
AGENT_SWARM_VERSION pinning support and published release tags |
Pinning a release in production, backups before upgrades |
RBAC on by default for aswt_ user tokens |
Who receives user tokens, and which roles they hold |
| OpenTelemetry export from API and workers, off by default | The telemetry backend, its access controls, and retention |
| Usage telemetry to the maintainers, on by default, with organization-level attribution | Keeping it on, or opting out on the API server and every worker |
A control appearing in the left column means it is implemented and documented in the repository. It does not mean the corresponding operational duty on the right is done for you.
Limits and contact
This page claims no certifications — not SOC 2, not ISO 27001, not any other. It claims no regulatory compliance, including GDPR and HIPAA, and no specific data-retention periods, and it does not describe a penetration test. Where a compliance question depends on how you configure your own deployment, the sections above describe which parts of that configuration are yours.
Before you rely on a self-hosted deployment, validate it against this checklist:
- A specific release is pinned in
AGENT_SWARM_VERSION, not blank. - The encryption key is set explicitly through
SECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEYorSECRETS_ENCRYPTION_KEY_FILE, and the key material is backed up with the database. - The API is reachable only over HTTPS, through your proxy.
- SSO via oauth2-proxy sits in front of the dashboard, and the API is not reachable except through the proxy.
/healthreturns successfully and at least one task has completed end to end.
Send security questions to contact@desplega.sh, including questions about services proposed in an enterprise agreement. You can also reach the team through the contact page.
Agent Swarm is developed in the open at github.com/desplega-ai/agent-swarm, where the code behind every control named here can be read and audited. For background on the team, see about; for how this website itself handles data, see the privacy policy. For a longer treatment of the self-hosted security model, in Spanish, read Seguridad en IA autohospedada.